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RECENT DECISIONS
Adoption - Dependent or Neglected Children
"Abandonment" - "Proper Parental Care"

-

Betty Hendricks, an unwed mother, gave her written consent to
the adoption of her infant daughter. On the same day, the child was
placed in the care and custody of the Currys for the purpose of adoption. After the Currys filed adoption proceedings, Betty Hendricks
withdrew her consent to adoption and sought to regain custody of
the child. The Currys, in an effort to prevent the natural mother
from regaining possession of the infant, filed suit to have the child
adjudged dependent or neglected. They relied on article 2337' which
provides that parents shall not have custody of a child adjudged to be
dependent or neglected as defined by article 2330. The trial court
entered judgment in favor of the Currys; the court of civil appeals
affirmed.' Held, reversed: The acts of an unwed mother in executing
her written consent to the adoption of her infant and delivering
possession of the child to the proposed adoptive parents do not render
a child "abandoned" nor deny it "proper parental care" within the
meaning of article 2330 relating to dependent or neglected children. Hendricks v. Curry, 401 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1966).
Under article 2330," a child will be declared dependent or neglected if the court finds he is "abandoned" or is not receiving "proper
parental care." The Texas Supreme Court in the instant case found
that the word "abandoned" as used in the statute is equivalent to
"deserted" and indicates a "conscious disregard or indifference" to
the child.' The mother's acts in giving up possession of the child and
'Tx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2337 (1964).
'TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2330 (1964).
'Hendricks v. Curry, 389 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
4
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2330 (1964) provides:
The term "dependent child" or "neglected child" includes any child under
sixteen years of age who is dependent upon the public for support or who is
destitute, homeless or abandoned; or who has not proper parental care or
guardianship, or who habitually begs or receives alms, or who is found living
in any house of ill fame or with any vicious or disreputable person, or whose
home, by reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity on the part of its parents,
guardian or other person in whose care it may be, is an unfit place for such
child; or any such child whose parents or guardian permit it to use intoxicating liquor except for medicinal purposes or to become addicted to the use of
such liquors, or permits it in or about any place where intoxicating liquors
are sold. [Emphasis added.]
'This definition was set out in Strode v. Silverman, 209 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948), in which the word "abandon" as used in article 46a was construed. The court in the
instant case felt the definition to be a sound one and determined that it should be followed
in construing the word abandon as used in article 2330.
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in giving her written consent to its adoption were held not to be acts
which would imply a conscious disregard or indifference to the child;
rather, they were acts done to provide better for the child's welfare.

The court also considered the meaning of "parental care" as used
in article 2330 and found it to be a purely descriptive term, referring
only to the kind and quality of care a child should receive. Parental
care need not be provided by the child's parents but may be furnished by persons occupying a parental position in the child's life,
either permanently or temporarily. If parental care could be supplied
only by the child's parents, it would be the duty of a court to declare a child dependent once the child was delivered to persons for the
purpose of adoption. The court concluded that proper parental care
was being provided by the Currys; hence, the child was not dependent or neglected.
M.N.M.

Damages
fering*

-Mathematical

Formula for Pain and Suf-

Eastman brought a civil diversity action in a federal district court
against Country Mutual Insurance Company seeking damages for
injuries sustained when his pickup truck was struck from behind by
a truck being driven by Mutual's insured. Eastman's counsel, in both
his opening statement and his rebuttal, suggested that the jury consider a mathematical formula ($70 per week for the rest of Eastman's
life) in determining the award for pain and suffering. Each time no
specific objection was raised. The jury returned an award of $73,926,
but the court required Eastman to enter a remittitur reducing the
judgment to $45,000. On appeal, the insurance company for the first
time urged error in the use of a mathematical formula to compute
damages for pain and suffering. Held, affirmed: Remittitur cures the
error of using a mathematical formula or, at least, removes the case
from the category of extreme cases where justice would require correction of the error by the appellate court even though no timely
objection was made in the trial court. Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Eastman, 356 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1966).
* EDrox's NOTE: As this issue was being printed, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc,
handed down another opinion which permits use of the mathematical formula upon proper
instruction by the trial judge. Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., No. 22680, sth Cir.,
Aug. 3, 1966. The Baron Tube case will be discussed in the next issue of the journal.
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The federal courts have been in disagreement over the propriety of
allowing a plaintiff's request for an award to compensate pain and
suffering which is based on a per-diem or waking-hours-for-life mathematical formula.' The question was thought to have been settled in
the Fifth Circuit with the 1965 decision of Johnson v. Colglazier,
In that case the trial court's allowance of a mathematical formula
was held reversible error in spite of a determination that the particular award was not excessive per se. The court stated, "the plaintiffs'
argument as a whole transgressed permissible bounds" and that "the
[trial] court's silence and non-action in not preventing and rebuking the argument was reversible error."'
Through the instart case, the Fifth Circuit has modified its former

stand by indicating that automatic reversal will not follow the oral
suggestion of a mathematical formula.4 The court indicates that in
the absence of objection to the argument remittitur alone is sufficient

to cure the error of using a formula. Such a holding seems logically
inconsistent with Johnson, where the verdict was not excessive and,
consequently, was not subject to remittitur.
M.L.T.

Evidence

-

Article 3737e

Admissibility of Hospital

-

Records Containing Medical Opinion Entries
Lula Andrews sued Loper for damages for personal injuries suf-

fered by Charles Andrews, a minor, in an automobile collision. A
controlling question was whether the boy suffered a skull fracture.
Dr. Swetland, the treating physician, testified that in his opinion the
boy had sustained such a fracture. Offered in evidence under article
3737e' were hospital records signed by Dr. Swetland which included
the following entry: "I have referred him to Dr. Hutchings for
examination and again he finds a papilledema of the left optic disc

of about two diopters. This, he believes, is definitely the result of a
fracture of the base of the skull. . .

."

A third doctor reached a con-

clusion different from that of Drs. Swetland and Hutchings. Counsel
' See Note, The Unit-of-Time Argument-Inherently Prejudicial?, 20 Sw. L.J. 208
(1966).
2 348 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1965), Note, 20 Sw. L.J. 208 (1966).
a 348 F.2d at 425.
' Note that Judge Brown was replaced by Senior Judge Whitaker of the U.S. Court of
Claims, sitting by designation.
'TEx. REV. CsV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Supp. 1966).
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for Loper objected to the admission of that portion of the hospital
record containing Dr. Hutching's medical opinion. Held: A diagnostic entry in a hospital record is admissible in evidence under article
3737e only when the diagnosis records a condition resting in reasonable medical certainty.! Loper v. Andrews, 404 S.W.2d 300 (Tex.
1966).

Article 3737e creates an exception to the hearsay rule and provides
that a record of an act or condition shall be competent evidence of the
occurrence of the act or existence of the condition when certain statutory conditions to admissibility are present.' The court in the instant
case listed two situations where recorded entry of a medical diagnosis
clearly qualifies as a record of a condition and is competent evidence
of the existence of the condition. First, the medical condition may be
apparent and observable by all (i.e., an open wound). Second, the
medical condition may be well recognized and reasonably certain but
requiring an expert interpretation (i.e., a diagnosis of leukemia).
Often, however, the patient's condition may be such that the resulting medical entry rests primarily in conjecture and speculation. The
court construed article 3737e as rendering hospital entries admissible
only in those instances where the diagnosis records a condition with
reasonable medical certainty. Since a difference of opinion existed
among the three physicians as to the existence of the skull fracture,
the medical entry was held to be a conjecture of Dr. Hutchings and
was inadmissible.
The instant case rectifies a misinterpretation of article 3737e which
existed since the 1959 case of Travis Life Ins. Co. v. Rodriquez."
There a court of appeals construed article 3737e as authorizing the
admission in evidence of hospital records containing a diagnosis of
leukemia. The opinion pointed out that such a diagnosis is not one
about which physicians ordinarily differ.' The per curiam refusal
'The court of appeals [Loper v. Andrews, 395 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)]
held the objection was insufficient to preserve the point for review. The Texas Supreme
Court, however, regarded the objection as suiicient although open to some doubt.
aTEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Supp. 1966) provides in relevant part:
Section 1. A memorandum or record of an act, event or condition shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence of the occurrence of the act or event
or the existence of the condition if the judge finds that:
(a) It was made in the regular course of business;
(b) It was the regular course of that business for an employee or representative of such business with personal knowledge of such act, event or condition
to make such memorandum or record or to transmit information thereof
to be included in such memorandum or record;
(c)
It was made at or near the time of the act, event or condition or reasonably soon thereafter.
4326 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
' Id. at 262.
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of error by the Texas Supreme Court' was construed in many recent
cases as holding that hospital records containing even disputable or
conjectural opinion entries are admissible under article 3737e.7 The
instant decision makes it clear that such entries are not admissible.
What is not clear are the criteria to be used to determine when a
medical opinion is "conjecture."

J.J.M.

Federal Courts - Uniform Commercial Code as
Source of Federal Law
In competing with four other electronics manufacturers invited to
submit proposals for the sale or lease of a new computer system to
the Federal Reserve Board, Wegematic Corporation submitted a detailed proposal which offered delivery within nine months from the
date the contract or purchase order was signed.' In September, 1956,
the Board accepted Wegematic's proposal, the order specifying delivery on June 30, 1957, with liquidated damages of one hundred dollars a day for delay. After several delays, 'Wegematic announced in
October, 1957, that it was impractical to deliver the computer system
and requested cancellation of the contract without damages. The
Board procured the equipment from another company and brought
suit for damages in a federal district court. The court awarded the
United States $235,806 in damages. Wegematic appealed, claiming
that delivery was made impossible by basic engineering difficulties
and that under federal law, which both parties conceded to govern,
this "practical impossibility" of completing the contract excused its
default in performance. Held, affirmed: The Uniform Commercial
Code should be used as a source in determining the federal law of sales,
and under section 2-615 of the code, a liquidated-damages clause in
a contract prevents the promisor from asserting the defense of "practical impossibility." United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674
(2d Cir. 1966).
In response to a suggestion by Wegematic the court looked to the
' Rodriquez v. Travis Life Ins. Co., 160 Tex. 182, 328 S.W.2d 434 (1959).
'See State Auto. & Cas. Underwriters v. Reagan, 337 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960); Missouri-Pacific R.R. v. Watson, 346 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref.
n.r.e.; White v. McElroy, 350 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e.
'In the invitations to the five firms, the Federal Reserve Board had stressed the importance of early delivery as a consideration in determining its choice.
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Uniform Commercial Code to determine the issue of impossibility.
In doing so, it construed section 2-615 of the code-"Excuse by failure of presupposed conditions"'-as making the test of impossibility
a question of how much risk the promisor assumes. The court held
that Wegematic's agreement to liquidated damages defeated its proposition of excuse through "practical impossibility." Had Wegematic
wished to be relieved of the risk involved in the new computer system,
the appropriate exculpatory language could have been used. Instead,
it assumed the risk by binding itself to a specific delivery date with
a penalty for late or non-performance.
Normally, in cases involving federal questions, the sources of federal law are the decisions of federal courts.' However, a uniform law
has sometimes been applied by the various circuits. In a 1950 case
the Second Circuit used the Negotiable Instruments Law as a source
of federal law." Judge Hand, in speaking of the NIL, said it is "more
complete and more certain, than any other which can conceivably
be drawn from those sources of 'general law' to which we were accustomed to resort in the days of Swift v. Tyson."' On the other hand,
the Second Circuit refused to recognize the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act as a source of federal law since the various states were
sharply divided over its interpretation.6 The instant case marks the
first time that a court of appeals has used the Uniform Commercial
Code as a source of federal law in commercial transactions involving
a federal question. The court noted that the code was adopted by
Congress for the District of Columbia and has been enacted by over
forty states. If the other courts of appeal and/or the Supreme Court
follow suit,7 the United States will have "a truly national law of
commerce."
J.M.M.

'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615 provides: "Except so far as a seller may have
assumed a greater obligation . . . delay in delivery or non-delivery . . . is not a breach
of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable
by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made. ..
"
'Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
4
New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 180 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1950).
5id.
at 244.
, Cargill, Inc. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 275 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1960).
"United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966).

Oil and Gas - Make-up of Overproduction Per Order
of Railroad Commission
Nine dummy wells on Sample's leasehold, classified as high marginal wells, were incapable of producing their scheduled allowables.
In violation of statewide rule 52,1 the capable wells on the same lease
produced their own allowables plus those assigned to the dummy
wells. The Railroad Commission determined that 58,061 barrels of
oil had thus been overproduced and ordered that Sample make up
this amount from future allowables. The district court rendered summary judgment for Sample, declaring the Commission's order to be

void. The Commission appealed directly to the Texas Supreme
Court.! Held, reversed and remanded: The Railroad Commission has
the power to require the operator of a lease to make up overproduction from future allowables. Railroad Comm'n v. Sample, 405
S.W.2d 338 (Tex. 1966).
In 1939, the Texas Attorney General expressed the opinion that
the Commission lacks the power to require a make-up of overproduction. This opinion has been disregarded during the past fifteen years,
and many operators have been required to make up overproduction
from future allowables. Furthermore, the present attorney general
has expressly renounced the earlier view. In the instant case, the Commission's power over overproduction was determined to derive from
section 7 of article 6049c,' which authorizes the Commission to
apportion production among various producers on a reasonable basis.
The court stated, "This broad grant of authority includes the power
to make reasonable adjustments in the allowable of a well or lease to
compensate for prior overproduction therefrom."
Sample, contending that the Commission's order was an imposition
of an extra-legislative penalty, relied on Harrington v. Railroad
Comm'n,' which held that the legislative penalties and sanctions for
violations of the conservation laws were exclusive and could not be
varied or altered by the Commission. Harrington did not, however,
decide the issue of the Commission's requiring an operator to make up
past overproduction. In the instant case, the Texas Supreme Court de-

termined that the Commission's order was not a penalty but a restric1 Statewide Rule 52, set out in TEX. R.R. COMm'N RULES & REas., as prepared by
R. W. Bynam & Co. (1958), provides that a well is entitled to produce its daily allowable
only to the extent of its actual production ability.
' A direct appeal to the Texas Supreme Court is authorized by TEx. Rav. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 1738a (1962).
ITEx.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6049c, § 7 (1962).
4
Railroad Comm'n v. Sample, 405 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. 1966).
5375 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. 1964).
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tion of actual production to the authorized amount and a protection
of other producers' correlative rights.
Justice Smith dissented on the grounds that the Commission's order
was a penalty for Sample's filing of incorrect testing procedures; that
no overproduction had actually been proved; that Sample had been
denied procedural due process; and that the Commission has no statutory authority to require a make-up of overproduction of oil. Despite the vigorous dissent, it would appear that the majority opinion,
through a reasonable statutory interpretation, has enabled the Commission to deal efficiently and effectively with the overproduction
problem and to avoid the more complicated aspects and criminal implications of a penalty proceeding."
P.R.K.

ReapportionmentCounty Commissioners' Precincts - Equal Population
Article V, section 18, of the Texas Constitution requires a division
of the counties of Texas "from time to time, for the convenience of
the people . . . into four commissioners precincts in each of which
there shall be elected by the qualified voters thereof one County
Commissioner." 1 The Midland County Commissioners' Court, acting
under this provision, redrew the Midland County commissioners' precinct lines in 1963. Precinct No. 1, which included the city of Midland, contained ninety-five per cent of the county population and
ninety-seven per cent of the eligible voters; while the remaining five
per cent of the county population was divided among the other three
districts. Avery, mayor of Midland, brought suit alleging that the
population disparity violated the Constitution of Texas and the
United States Constitution. The district court found that the districting plan was unconstitutional and ordered the commissioners' court
to redistrict so that each precinct would have substantially the same
number of people. The court of civil appeals reversed, stating, "neither the Constitution of the United States nor the Constitution of
Texas . . . contains any requirement that county commissioners precincts be equal to each other in population."' Avery brought error.
'TEx.

REV.

Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6036 (1962)

1TEx. CONST. art. 5,

'Midland
added.)

provides for such a penalty proceeding.

5 18.

County v. Avery, 397 S.W.2d 919, 921 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)

(Emphasis
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Held: A rational variance from equality in population in commissioners' precincts is constitutional if based upon additional relevant
factors such as number of qualified voters, land areas, geography,
miles of county roads, and taxable values! Avery v. Midland County, 9 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 579 (1966).
The court recognized that the United States Constitution requires
counties to provide representational plans with fundamental equality in voting rights. However, while agreeing with the district court
that the Midland County districts must be redrawn, the court held
that neither the Texas Constitution nor the Constitution of the
United States makes population the sole criterion for division of Texas
counties into commissioners' precincts. The court reasoned that the
strict population equality ordered in the legislative and congressional
reapportionment suits' did not apply to commissioners' courts whose
precincts were drawn "for the convenience of the people" as required
by the Texas Constitution. It added that with strict population equality the urban areas would in most cases control the commissioners'
court, although developments in the last few years have narrowed
the scope of the functions of the commissioners' court, limiting its
major responsibilities to the nonurban areas of the county.
If the court's distinction between the commissioners' courts and
legislative bodies is valid, then the instant case may well answer the
reapportionment problems of local government units. However, it is
highly unlikely that such a distinction is valid as long as tax monies,
county roads, welfare funds, and a myriad of other functions directly affecting the city dweller are administered by the county
commissioners' court.' In any event, there is a substantial federal question involved, and it is questionable whether the United States Supreme Court will accept the reasoning of the Texas Supreme Court.
C.M.D.

Securities - Securities Exchange Act -

Section 14(a)

Proxy Rules Extended
Gittlin, holding 5,000 shares of Studebaker stock and acting under
written authorization from holders of more than 145,000 shares, in' Since the additional relevant factors were not considered by the commissioners' court,
a new redistricting was ordered, but at a time that would not interfere with the 1966
elections.
'Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
' See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 2351-72 (1964) for the powers and duties of the
commissioners' courts.
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stituted a proceeding in the Supreme Court of New York to inspect
the company's shareholder list. The move was part of a plan by Gittlin and his associates to force changes in the corporation's board of
directors and was a preparatory tactic to proxy solicitation for the
annual shareholder meeting. Upon the motion of Studebaker Corporation, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York enjoined the use of the shareholders' authorizations because
of noncompliance with the proxy rules of the Securities and Exchange
Commission issued under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act.' Two rules were involved: 14a-3, prohibiting solicitation in the
absence of a proxy statement containing specified information; and
14a-6, stating that preliminary copies of any proxy material must be
filed with the SEC at least ten days prior to solicitation of shareholders. Gittlin appealed the order to the Second Circuit, contending
that the proxy rules do not cover authorizations for the sole purpose
of exercising a right of inspection granted by state law; that the
corporation had no standing to seek an injunction; and that the
district court's order violated the federal anti-injunction statute.
Held, affirmed: The proxy rules issued by the SEC under Exchange
Act Section 14 (a) cover the giving of any authorization which is part
of a continuous plan intended to culminate in proxy solicitation; a
corporation has standing to enjoin proxy rule violations by a shareholder in an independent action; and the policy underlying the federal
anti-injunction provision may be superseded by the necessity of effective federal securities regulation. Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360
F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966).
By holding that the proxy provisions may cover authorizations to
enforce the New York right of shareholder inspection, the court relied upon the 1943 case of SEC v. Okin.3 There the Second Circuit
ruled that a request to shareholders, which did not go so far as to
request an authorization, nevertheless was subject to the proxy rules
if the request were part of a continuous plan of solicitation.
Before the instant case, some doubt may have existed as to whether
the Exchange Act Proxy Rules gave a corporation standing to protect itself against unlawful solicitation of its shareholders. This attitude was given force by an earlier decision of the Second Circuit,
Howard v. Furst,' holdinz that the act cave no remedy to a corpora'Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1965).
2 62 Stat. 968 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1965). This statute prohibits a federal court
from issuing "an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
3132 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1943).
4238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957).
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tion in such a situation. Howard was partially invalidated by the

Supreme Court in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,5 which involved a derivative

action brought by a shareholder to assert a claim of harm to the
corporation caused by unlawful solicitation. The Borak Court held
that the derivative cause of action could be asserted and thus opened
the door to allowing a direct action by the corporation. The court in
Gittlin affirmatively stated that a corporation may protect itself from
Exchange Act solicitation violations in an independent action. By
recognizing that the proxy rules cover authorizations to enforce a
state-granted right of inspection and that a corporation may enjoin
a violation in an independent action, the court founded its decision
upon the realities of corporate control battles.
In answer to Gittlin's defense based on the anti-injunction statute,
the court found an exception to that statute to exist where national
interest in securities regulation is present. The congressional purpose
of providing effective securities regulations and the national interest
in protecting both the corporation and the shareholder in proxy
battles seem to justify the Gittlin court in extending the scope of section 14 (a) rules.

T.M.J.

Statutes -

Disposition of Property Not Needed for

Highway Purposes -

Repeal of Article 6674q-9

In 1938 the Texas Highway Commission relocated a state highway.
Additional land was needed for the new right-of-way, and the state
of Texas purchased a thirty-acre tract. The highway constructed on
this land was subsequently abandoned, and a contest arose over title
to two acres within the originally purchased thirty-acre tract. Easley
claimed title to the two acres under article 6674q-9,1 and the state
of Texas, who had brought this suit in the nature of a trespass to try
title action, relied on article 6673a, section 1. The trial court found
for Easley, and the court of civil appeals affirmed.' Held, reversed:

Article 6674q-9, which provides that land no longer needed for highway purposes shall vest in the previous owner, is effectively repealed,
and such abandoned land now remains under the control of the State
5377

U.S. 426 (1964).
'See S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 62d Sess. 77 (1934).
TEX. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 6 74q-9 (1960).
'TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6673a, S 1 (1960).
aState v. Easley, 390 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
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Highway Commission as provided in article 6673a, section 1. State v.
Easley, 404 S.W. 2d 296 (Tex. 1966).
Article 6674q-9 provides that when donated right-of-way land
has been abandoned, the title shall vest in the donative owner, his
heirs or assigns." Article 6673a, section 1, on the other hand, states
that when a highway right-of-way is no longer needed, the State
Highway Commission may make recommendations to the Governor
regarding disposition of the land.' In the instant case, the Texas Supreme Court held that these two statutes were in direct and irreconcilable conflict. Therefore, the last expression of the legislature on the
subject is the controlling provision. Being the latest enactment, article
6673a was held to be the controlling law; and article 6 6 74q-9 was
repealed. Certainly a better working system will result with abandoned highway land remaining under the auspices of the State Highway Commission, the agency responsible for maintaining an adequate
highway system.
B.A.E.

Taxation

-

Franchise Tax -

Business Receipts Within

Texas
Yoakum" Industries, Inc., a Texas corporation, brought suit against
the state comptroller to recover a portion of franchise taxes paid under
protest. The disputed portion of the tax was based on interest and
dividends from intangibles (stocks and bonds) received in Texas by
Yoakum from corporations chartered in states other than Texas. The
Texas franchise tax law prior to its amendment in 1959 had provided
for a tax on gross receipts of a corporation "from its business done
in Texas." 1 The Comptroller had interpreted this statute to include
only business income received from corporations chartered in Texas;
consequently, if dividends and interest were paid by a corporation
chartered in a state other than Texas, such receipts were not in4 Article

66

74q-9 provides in relevant part: "[W]hen the right-of-way, or any part
thereof, pertaining either to a State Highway or a lateral road, has been abandoned . . .
for all public purposes, and such right-of-way . . . was donated by the owner of the land
for right-of-way purposes, then . . . the title to said right-of-way shall vest in said owner,
his heirs or assigns. . ."
'Article 6673a, § 1 provides in relevant part: "Whenever the State Highway Commission determines that any real property . . . acquired by the State for highway purposes,
is no longer needed for such purposes . . .. the State Highway Commission may recommend to the Governor that such land . . . be sold, and the Governor may execute a proper
deed conveying all the State's rights, title and interest in such land."
' Former art. 7084, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1951).
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cluded in the franchise tax base of the corporate receiver. In 1959,
the state legislature had amended the franchise tax statute to read
that the term 'gross receipts from its business done in Texas' shall
include, inter alia, "all other business receipts within Texas." 2 Yoakum
argued that by the amendment the Legislature had merely sanctioned
former administrative interpretation, i.e., that dividends received
by a Texas corporation from foreign corporations were not subject
to the franchise tax. The district court granted summary judgment
for Yoakum. Held, reversed and rendered: Interest and dividends
from intangibles received within Texas from sources without the
state constitute "gross business receipts" within the Texas franchise
tax law. Calvert v. Yoakum Indus., Inc., 403 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966).
The court presumed that the state legislature enacted the 1959
amendment as a change in existing law and to increase the revenue
of the state. The court decided, therefore, to follow the construction
of the franchise tax provision presently urged by the Comptroller and
tax a Texas corporation receiving business income from out-of-state
corporations. In fact, on the same day the principal case was decided,
the court in Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Calvert' extended its interpretation of the amended franchise tax provision to include dividends

and interest received by a foreign corporation which has its corporate
headquarters or "commercial domicile" in Texas.4
All provisions of the amendment defining gross receipts -from business done in Texas, for franchise tax purposes, stress the inclusion of

receipts only from sources within Texas.' That the last phrase-"All
other business receipts within Texas"-was intended to switch taxa-

tion emphasis from place of payor to place of receipt and to reverse
established administrative interpretation of the franchise law's application, seems rather unlikely. If a switch in emphasis was intended, the
Legislature could have easily so expressed its intent.
S.P.B.
'The amended statute, TEx. TAx-GEN. ANN. art. 12.02 (1960),
term "gross receipts from its business done in Texas" shall include:
(a)

provides that the

Sales of tangible personal property located within Texas at the time of

the receipt of or appropriation of the orders where shipment is made to points
within the State,
(b) Services performed within Texas,
(c) Rentals from property situated, and royalties from the use of patents or
copyrights, within Texas, and
(d) All other business receipts within Texas. [Emphasis added.]
'404 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
' In support of the theory of commercial domicile the court cited City of Amarillo v.
Carter Trucking, 380 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); and Wirt Franklin Petroleum
Corp. v. Gruen, 139 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1944).
5 See note 2 sun'a.

Taxation - Texas Election Code
Primary Election Assessment

-Deductibility

of

Judge Davenport was a candidate for re-election to the office of
district judge. The Texas Election Code requires that an assessment,
amounting to his proportionate share of the election costs, be levied
against each candidate in a primary election Davenport sought a tax
deduction for his $1,958.40 assessment and, upon being denied the
deduction, filed suit for refund. He asserted that the assessment was
deductible either as an ordinary and necessary business expense under
section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, as an ordinary and necessary expense incurred for the production of income (section 212),
or as a deductible state tax (section 164).' The deduction was disallowed by the Commissioner. The district court reversed, granting the
deduction "since the payment was a necessary and proper expenditure not only for the carrying on of the business but for the production of the business."' Held:' An assessment required by the Texas
Election Code of all candidates in a primary election is not deductible
for tax purposes under sections 162 and 212 of the Internal Revenue
Code. Campbell v. Davenport, 362 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1966).
In determining that the assessment was not deductible under section 162 as a business expense or under section 212 as an expense
incurred for the production of income, the court applied the rationale
of McDonald v. Commissioner.' There Judge McDonald, who had
been appointed to fill a vacancy and who was seeking his first elected
term in office, sought to deduct his campaign expenses as well as an
"assessment" paid to his party organization to obtain its support. The
Supreme Court stated that the performance of the functions of juTEX. ELECTION CODE ANN. art. 1307a (Supp. 1966) quoted in pertinent part:
Every candidate subject to assessment by the county executive committee under
Section 186 or Section 186a of this Code for a portion of the expenses of
holding the primary elections . . . shall pay . . . at the time of filing his
application for a place on the ballot, a deposit of fifty dollars .....
After

the county executive committee makes the assessments, it shall refund to each
candidate within thirty days thereafter the amount of the payment in excess of
the assessment against the candidate, if the deposit exceeds the assessment.
If the deposit does not exceed the assessment, the balance due on the assessment
shall be paid [by the taxpayer] as provided in Section 186.
TEx. ELECTION CODE ANN. art. 1308 (Supp. 1966) quoted in pertinent part: "[T]he
county committee . . . shall apportion such cost in such manner as in their judgment is
just and equitable among the various candidates for . . . [the various] offices."
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162, 164, 212.

'Davenport v. Campbell, 238 F. Supp. 568, 572 (N.D. Tex. 1964).
' The court held that the assessment constituted a tax and was deductible under S
164 of the code. This result is of little importance to post-1964 taxpayers, as such assessments are no longer deductible under the 1964 amendments to the code. Revenue Act of
1964, 78 Stat. 19, § 207a, amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 164a.
5323 U.S. 57 (1944).
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dicial office constituted carrying on a trade or business under the terms
of the code and that all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in
carrying on that trade or business were deductible. A distinction was
drawn, however, between expenditures made with a view toward "securing" election and expenses incurred in "performing" the functions of public office. The Court refused to allow a deduction for
Judge McDonald's campaign expenses or party assessment since such
expenses were incurred in securing his public office.

In the instant case the Fifth Circuit ignores any distinction that
might exist between expenses incurred by a judge seeking election for
the first time (McDonald) and one seeking re-election (Davenport).
Moreover, the court has extended the Supreme Court's reasoning in
McDonald to include "involuntary" expenses required by law. The
expenses incurred by Judge McDonald were voluntary campaign ex-

penses such as advertising, printing, travelling, and an assessment for
party support. The assessment levied against Judge Davenport, how-

ever, was required by the Texas Election Code as a prerequisite to
placing his name on the ballot.
J.M.K.

